In a sample of 776 venture capital-backed IPOs, I find that IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform IPOs with less optimistic managers in the long-run. Moreover, the IPOs of the most optimistic managers underperform in the long-run when compared to a benchmark portfolio, while the IPOs of the least optimistic manager do not. In particular, IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform IPOs with less optimistic managers by about 45% (40%) on an equal-weighted (value-weighted) basis in the 5-year period following the offer. Indeed, even relative to their style matched portfolio, the firms of the most optimistic managers underperform by about 43% (71%) on an equal-weighted (value-weighted) basis. These results are confirmed using a calendar-time risk-adjusted portfolio approach. Is the long-run underperformance a result of overinvestment or underinvestment? The evidence suggests that it is driven by underinvestment. In fact, the investment of more optimistic managers is significantly lower than for less optimistic managers for 4 of the 5 fiscal years after the offer. These results are robust to industry-adjusting and the inclusion of additional explanatory variables including cash holdings. I also find some evidence that investment is sensitive to cash flows, with high cash flow IPOs mitigating a portion of the underinvestment in some of the years following the offer. Finally, managerial optimism is significantly and positively associated to first-day returns, suggesting more optimistic managers are more prone to using to the middle of the file price range as a reference point from which they anchor. JEL classification: G12; G14; G24
Introduction
In this paper, I find that IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform IPOs with less optimistic managers in the long-run. Moreover, the IPOs of the most optimistic managers underperform in the long-run when compared to a benchmark portfolio, while the IPOs of the least optimistic manager do not. Furthermore, firms with more optimistic managers invest less in research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures relative to firms with less optimistic managers. These results suggest that the underperformance of IPOs is in part driven by the underinvestment of the most optimistic managers relative to less optimistic managers.
There is a large literature devoted to the long-run stock performance of initial public offerings. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) are among the first to document the long-run underperformance of IPOs. Ritter (1991) attributes the underperformance to an IPO market in which investors tend to be overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth firms. Other studies document additional patterns in long-run performance. For example, Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) find that underperformance is concentrated among nonventure capital-backed firms and small firms with low book-to-market ratios, and there is no general underperformance of IPO firms. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggest that IPO investors pay too much attention to optimistic growth forecasts and too little attention to profitability in valuing IPOs, giving rise to overvaluation at the offer price and a long-run decline to fair value. Despite these and other studies on IPOs, the sources of differences in long-run underperformance remain unresolved. Why do some IPO firms underperform relative to others? Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that overinvestment by optimistic managers may help explain some of the long-run underperformance. However, both overinvestment and underinvestment can lead to long-run underperformance. According to Heaton (2002) , managers 1 who are optimistic about future projects overinvest by taking on negative net present value (NPV) projects that they perceive to be positive NPV projects. Alternatively, managers who are optimistic about assets in place underinvest by declining positive NPV projects which require external financing because they believe the market undervalues their company's stock. Both of these scenarios would lead to long-run underperformance.
This study finds that IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform IPOs with less optimistic managers by about 45% on an equal-weighted basis in the 5-year period following the offer. On a value-weighted basis, firms of more optimistic managers underperform firms of less optimistic managers by about 40% over the same period. Similar results are obtained when returns are style-adjusted using a size and book-to-market reference portfolio. Indeed, even relative to their style matched portfolio, the firms of the most optimistic managers underperform by about 43% (71%) on an equal-weighted (value-weighted) basis. These results are confirmed using a calendar-time risk-adjusted portfolio approach. Is the long-run underperformance a result of overinvestment or underinvestment? The evidence suggests that it is driven by underinvestment. The IPOs of more optimistic managers tend to invest less than the IPOs with less optimistic managers. The investment (research & development plus capital expenditures divided by assets) of more optimistic managers is significantly lower than for less optimistic managers for 4 of the 5 fiscal years after the offer. These results are robust to industry-adjusting and the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. I also find some evidence that investment is sensitive to cash flows, with high cash flow IPOs mitigating a portion of the underinvestment in some of the years following the offer.
The main challenge in assessing the impact of managerial optimism on long-run performance is finding a reasonable measure of managerial optimism. I use the file-to-value ratio 2 as such a measure. The numerator is the value of the firm at the filing date, and it represents the manager's appraisal of the firm's value. The denominator is the most recent valuation, given after a round of funding in the three years prior to the filing date by one of the venture capitalists backing the IPO, and it represents the firm's intrinsic value. Therefore, the file-to-value ratio represents how optimistic the manager's valuation is relative to the venture capitalist's valuation.
The passage of time, the venture capital round financing received between the venture capital valuation date and the filing date, and changes in market conditions between the venture capital valuation date and the filing date, may potentially explain some of the variation in the file-tovalue. Furthermore, Ivanov, Krishnan, Masulis, and Singh (2010) find that IPOs with higher venture capitalist reputation tend to have better long-run performance than IPOs with lower venture capitalist reputation. Therefore, I purge the file-to-value ratio of these potentially confounding effects in a first-stage regression, and use the residual from this regression as a second measure of managerial optimism.
I find that overall, IPO firm managers tend to be very optimistic, in that they value the firm on average 3 times higher than the venture capitalist valuation. Furthermore, a higher fileto-value ratio is associated with a greater proportion of male CEOs, who have been shown in the literature to be associated with more overconfidence. Also, the file-to-value ratio is positively related with leverage and negatively related with the fraction of the firm sold at the offer, firm characteristics which have been found to also be associated with managerial optimism. These findings suggest that managers with high file-to-value ratios are in fact more optimistic than managers with low file-to-value ratios.
There are three other potential explanations for the results found in this paper. First, Stein (2003) notes that managerial optimism shares its predictions with models of agency theory such 3 as Jensen and Meckling (1976) , or models of information asymmetry such Myers and Majluf (1984) . I include multiple independent variables to control for the empire-building manager's preference for presiding over a larger firm and the information asymmetry between the manager and investors.
Second, optimistic managers unwittingly price their issue high because they overestimate their future cash flows or underestimate the discount rate, whereas market timing managers realize that their assets are overvalued in the market, and price their offer high to take advantage of this misvaluation.
1 I control for this alternate explanation by including firm and market-level variables of consumer and investor optimism, as well as uncertainty, all of which may be at the root of the misvaluation which managers would potentially take advantage of.
Last, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) show that long-run market performance can be driven by discretionary current accruals. Managers can increase current accruals by, for example, advancing recognition of revenues with credit sales before cash is received or by delaying the recognition of expenses when cash is advanced to suppliers. Discretionary current accruals are not independent of managerial optimism however. Teoh et al. (1998a) note that high discretionary current accruals may result from unintentional overoptimism by managers about future cash flows. I nevertheless include their measure of discretionary current accruals and find that the results are not being driven by earnings management.
This paper contributes to the IPO literature by documenting empirically for the first time a role for managerial optimism in explaining the long-run performance of IPOs. This relationship is driven by managers who are more optimistic about assets in place and underinvest in their firm in the years after the offer relative to managers who are less optimistic. This is also the first time that underinvestment has been found in a sample of IPOs: this may not be surprising given these 1 See Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) for more detail about irrational managers.
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firms are precisely the types of firms which are likely to have insufficient internal funds to subsidize all of their prospective projects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics of the sample.
Section 4 examines the link between the file-to-value ratio and managerial optimism. Section 5 presents buy-and-hold portfolio returns, cross-sectional return regressions and calendar-time portfolio regressions. Section 6 examines whether overinvestment or underinvestment may explain the long-run underperformance of optimistic managers by examining investment activities. Section 7 reports short-run return regressions, and Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) are among the first to document long-run underperformance for IPOs. Ritter (1991) attributes the underperformance to an IPO market in which investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth firms. Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav et al. (2000) find that the underperformance described in Loughran and Ritter (1995) is concentrated among nonventure capital-backed firms and small firms with low book-to-market. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggest that IPO investors pay too much attention to optimistic growth forecasts and too little attention to profitability in valuing IPOs, giving rise to a long-run decline to fair value.
One explanation for the underperformance of some IPOs is that investors are irrational, in that they are too optimistic or overconfident. These behavioral traits lead to overvaluation followed by long-run underperformance. The overvaluation is cause by optimistic investors who pay too much for shares in a firm. Alternatively, having overconfident investors (some of who 5 err on the optimistic side while others err on the pessimistic side) would lead to the same conclusion if the pessimistic investors are kept on the sidelines due to short sales constraints or limits to arbitrage. The subsequent long-run underperformance is the result of investors discovering the true firm value over time. Miller (1977) predicts that in the presence of shortsales constraints, the price of a firm tends to reflect the valuations of the most optimistic investors, and thus tend to be upward biased. 2 This is the case because pessimistic investors are forced out of the market when short-sales are not available. Therefore, greater divergence in investor beliefs about the firm's true value will lead to short-run overvaluation and long-run underperformance. Even when short-sales are allowed after the offer, the view of pessimistic investors may not be reflected in the prices in the short-run because there are limits to arbitrage in practice (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose that overvaluation is due to investor overconfidence about the precision of their private information. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) model IPO pricing assuming the existence of a fraction of sentiment-driven investors who are overoptimistic about the prospects of the IPO firms. With regards to IPOs, both of these theories imply overvaluation, which when subsequently corrected, leads to poor long-run performance. A number of recent empirical papers lend support to the existence of irrational investors in IPO markets.
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Another potential explanation for the long-run underperformance of some IPOs is that managers are irrational, in that they overestimate their future cash flows or underestimate the discount rate. Heaton (2002) finds in his theoretical paper that managers who are optimistic about future projects overinvest by taking on negative NPV projects that they perceive to be positive NPV projects. Alternatively, managers who are optimistic about assets in place underinvest by declining positive NPV projects which require external financing, because they believe the market undervalues their company's stock. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find both theoretically and empirically, that overconfident CEOs invest more when they have more cash at hand, but curtail investment when they require external financing. 4 Further, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is strongest for CEOs of equity-dependent firms. Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that the overinvestment caused by managerial optimism may be a source of longrun underperformance in IPOs. Loughran and Ritter (1997) reputation. This could be due to the added benefits, such as board participation and industry expertise, which reputable VCs provide. I purge the file-to-value ratio of these potentially confounding effects in a first-stage regression, and use the residual from this regression as a second measure of managerial optimism.
Using file-to-value and residual file-to-value as measures of managerial optimism, I test the hypothesis that IPO firms with more optimistic managers underperform IPO firms with less 9 optimistic managers. This paper contributes to the IPO literature by documenting empirically for the first time the role of managerial optimism in explaining the long-run performance of some IPOs. Also, this paper shows that the relationship between managerial optimism and long-run underperformance is driven by managers who are too optimistic about assets in place and underinvest in their company in the years after the offer relative to less optimistic managers.
There are three other potential explanations for the results found in this paper. First, Stein (2003) notes that the optimistic manager described in this paper shares its predictions with models of agency theory such as that of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or models of information asymmetry such as that of Myers and Majluf (1984) . I include multiple independent variables to control for the empire-building manager's preference for presiding over a larger firm and the information asymmetry between the manager and investors.
Second, optimistic managers price their issue at a high value because they overestimate their future cash flows or underestimate the discount rate. Market timing managers, on the other hand, realize that their assets are overvalued in the market, and price their offer high to take advantage of this misvaluation. The misvaluation in the market may be due to asymmetric information between managers and investors, as in Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) , overly optimistic investors, as in Wong (1998a, 1998b) , or waves of investor sentiment, as in Baker and Wurgler (2006) . 8 I control for this alternate explanation by including firm and market-level variables of consumer and investor optimism, as well as uncertainty, all of which may be at the root of the misvaluation which managers would potentially take advantage of.
Third, Teoh et al. (1998a) show that long-run market performance can be driven by discretionary current accruals. Managers can increase current accruals by, for example, 8 See Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) for a review of security offerings and market timing.
advancing recognition of revenues with credit sales before cash is received or by delaying the recognition of expenses when cash is advanced to suppliers. The business conditions usually faced by a firm in its industry may justify some accrual adjustments. Given that these business conditions can be expected by investors, current accruals must therefore be decomposed into nondiscretionary current accruals (current accruals predicted by industry conditions) and discretionary current accruals (current accruals not predicted by industry conditions).
Discretionary current accruals are not independent of managerial optimism however. Teoh et al. (1998a) note that high discretionary current accruals may result from unintentional overoptimism by managers about future cash flows. Nevertheless, I control for the possibility that managerial optimism may be related to earnings management by including discretionary current accruals as an explanatory variable.
Data and Summary Statistics

Data
The initial Throughout the paper the data will be winsorized at the 1 and 99% level to ensure that extreme outliers are not driving the results. However, the results remain qualitatively similar when the data is not winsorized. reputation. The file-to-value ratio (FV/VCV) is the ratio of the middle point of the filing range multiplied by the number of shares outstanding before the offer plus shares filed, to the venture capital firm's valuation obtained within three years before the filing date. 14 The file-to-value ratio is greater than 1 for about 91% of the sample, indicating that IPOs are highly valued by almost all managers at the file date. In fact, managers value their firm at 4.22 (2.73) times the venture capitalist value in mean (median). The VC valuation is obtained up to three years prior to the file date, but on average, it is obtained 344 days before the file date. In fact, for 61% of firms, the VC valuation is obtained within 1 year of the file date. Also, while firms receive about 9 million dollars in additional funding between the VC valuation date and the file date, 67% of firms receive no additional funding. As would be expected over the course of an average year, the S&P500 level and the consumer price index increase. Consumer sentiment also increases, but investor sentiment decreases insignificantly. In terms of financing characteristics, the VC valuation is obtained during the seed or early stage for 13% of firms, during the expansion stage for 48% of firms, and during the late stage for 30% of firms. On average, 7 different VC firms provide financing each company in the sample. These companies receive on average 4 rounds of financing for total financing of about 60 million dollars. Firms tend to retain high reputation underwriters, which is not surprising given this sample is entirely composed of VC-backed IPOs.
Summary Statistics
When compared to all the VC-backed IPOs during the same period (not shown here), the underwriter reputation in this paper is actually quite representative. The results in this paper remain qualitatively similar when using a 2 or 4-year windows instead of a 3-year window.
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IPOs, the file-to-value ratio remains fairly consistent through time: mean values vary from 2.28 to 4.78, while median values vary from 1.90 to 3.64. All variables are described in detail in the appendix.
Residual Managerial Optimism
Model 1 reports the impact of changes in firm and market characteristics on File-toValue. As suggested in the caveats of this method of valuation, the further away the venture capital valuation date is from the filing date, the greater is the file-to-value ratio. VCs provide more funding in general to the firms in their portfolios that do not perform as well.
Lastly, more reputable underwriters do command a higher value at the filing date, while more reputable VCs do not. Model 3 incorporates all of the independent variables from Models 1 and 2. The only remarkable difference in the coefficients from Models 1 and 2 is that the coefficient on additional VC funding provided between the VC valuation date and the file date is now significantly positive when controlling for total funding. This suggests that funding provided near to the going public process does lead to a higher valuation at the filing date.
Throughout the rest of this paper, the residual from Model 3 will serve as a second measure of managerial optimism, which is purged of the effects of changes in market conditions and the impacts of venture capitalists and lead underwriters.
Managerial Optimism
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In this section, the link between the file-to-value ratio and managerial optimism is explored. In order to do this, I look at whether File-to-Value is related to some CEO and firm characteristics, which have been associated with managerial optimism in the literature.
Specifically, I examine three CEO characteristics (gender, age and education) and two firm characteristics (leverage and fraction of the firm sold in the IPO). Barber and Odean (2001) find that men tend to be more overconfident than women in that they overestimate the precision of their information. This leads them to turn over their portfolios more often and, given trading costs, leads to worse market performance. For entrepreneurs, greater overconfidence should be associated with more optimism since pessimistic entrepreneurs are unable to sell-short their firm, and so consequently they "stay on the sidelines". Landier and Thesmar (2009) argue that entrepreneurs with more experience and higher education enjoy a larger outside option on the labor market, which translate into more optimism. However, education could also lead to lower optimism if it gives entrepreneurs a "big picture" view. Both Heaton (2002) and Landier and Thesmar (2009) find a pecking order of financing when managers are optimistic. Optimistic managers prefer to use internal funds first, debt second and equity last. According to this pecking order, more optimistic managers raising financing through an IPO must be more leveraged.
Further, if optimistic managers overestimate the future cash flows of assets in place, they will believe that their firm is undervalued by capital markets and will restrict the fraction they sell in their company. All variables are described in detail in the appendix. The cross-sectional relationship with RFTV
in column 2 is formally tested using the same multivariate regression model as above, except that RFTV is the dependent variable. A notable difference from the univariate results in Table 3 is that CEO education becomes marginally insignificant in column 1.
A notable economic result in Table 4 is that the file-to-value ratio is about 40% higher for 
Managerial Optimism and Long-Run Market Performance
This section examines whether there is a relationship between managerial optimism and long-run market performance. I find that IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform
IPOs with less optimistic managers in the 5-year period following the offer. Fama (1998) and Brav et al. (2000) make the point that equal-weighting a portfolio's returns gives more weight to small stocks relative to their capitalization in the market, and therefore leads to more severe badmodel problems. 15 They also point out that returns which are value-weighted more accurately capture the total wealth effects experienced by investors. For these two reasons, I examine both equal and value-weighted portfolio returns. As will be shown, results are robust to a styleadjusted benchmark as well as value-weighting. Empirical p-values are also reported since the sample distribution of buy-and-hold returns tends to be highly misspecified in long-run event studies. documents a significantly positive relationship between firm age and buy-and-hold returns. The difference may be due to the subsample of VC-backed IPOs examined in this paper, which are about twice as large (in terms of market capitalization) and 9 years older than in the overall sample of IPOs. Discretionary current accruals lead to lower SBHRs as expected, although this relationship is not significant. Lastly, consumer sentiment is significantly and negatively associated with SBHRs, suggesting that some of the long-run underperformance may be caused by initial overvaluation.
Cross-Sectional Univariate Analysis
Calendar-Time Portfolio Analysis
The evidence presented up to now shows that high File-to-Value IPOs underperform low Calendar-time risk-adjusted returns (FF-α) are obtained using Fama and French (1993) three-factor regressions involving the equal-weighted monthly calendar time returns of IPO portfolios. IPOs can remain in the sample for the holding period after which time they drop out.
More specifically, for the 5-year holding period, the monthly portfolios are constructed as follows: IPOs are assigned to one of high, medium, or low File-to-Value portfolios as they become public, and stay in their respective portfolios for 5 years. The monthly returns used to run the Fama-French three-factor regression are the equal and value-weighted monthly returns for each File-to-Value portfolio. The risk-adjusted return is the intercept from this regression. Table 7 reports the results of these regressions for equal and value-weighted portfolios, the intercepts of which can be interpreted as the average risk-adjusted monthly abnormal returns for the 5-year holding period. Panel A reports results for raw File-to-Value (FTV), while Panel B
shows results for residual File-to-Value (RFTV). Overall, I find no underperformance on a riskadjusted basis in this sample of VC-backed IPOs (row entitled All IPOs). In Panel A, the intercept for the high minus low FTV zero-investment portfolio is −1.14% (significant at the 1% level), indicating that the high FTV portfolio underperforms the low FTV portfolio by about 68%
(1.14% × 60 months) over a 5-year period on an equal-weighted basis. On a value-weighted basis, the intercept for the high minus low FTV zero-investment portfolio is −1.31%, which over a 5-year period yields a 79% (1.31 × 60) difference. These results are much greater in magnitude than the style-adjusted buy-and-hold return differentials found in Table 5 . This difference may be due to the fact that I require a sufficient number of observations to implement the calendar-time approach, which restricts the sample to 1996-2006 as mentioned above. Overall, the change in abnormal return is monotonic across portfolios. When examining the individual value-weighted portfolios, we can see that high FTV firms underperform significantly on a risk-adjusted basis, while low FTV firms do not. Hence, the underperformance in the high minus low hedge portfolio is driven by the underperformance of high FTV firms rather than the outperformance of low FTV firms. This supports the idea that optimistic managers are destroying value rather than the idea that conservative managers are creating value. Panel B presents results that are similar to those in 22 Panel A. The underperformance in the equal-weighted portfolios for the high minus low RFTV is slightly smaller in magnitude than for the high minus low FTV in Panel A, but slightly larger in the value-weighted portfolios. Economically, the high RFTV portfolio earns about 59% (0.98 × 60) less than the low RFTV portfolio in the equal-weighted returns, and about 111% (1.85 × 60) less in the value-weighted returns.
Managerial Optimism and Long-Run Investment
In this section, long-run investment is analyzed to determine whether the long-run return differentials found in the last section might be the result of overinvestment or underinvestment on the part of optimistic managers. Recall from Section 2 that managers who are optimistic about future projects overinvest by taking on negative NPV projects that they perceive to be positive NPV projects. Alternatively, managers who are optimistic about assets in place underinvest by declining positive NPV projects which require external financing because they believe the market undervalues their company's stock. The evidence that will be provided supports the latter interpretation. One corollary to the underinvestment argument is that the investment should be sensitive to cash flows, such that firms with more cash flow underinvest less than firms with more cash flow. I find some support for this in our sample. Lastly, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) find that firms (especially IPOs) in recent years have been holding more cash. They attribute this finding mainly to a precautionary motive (firms hold cash to cope with adverse shocks when access to capital markets is costly). Brown and Petersen (2010) The subscript t denotes the fiscal year after the IPO. out of the first 5 fiscal years and significant for 2 (1) of those years. Finally, it should be noted that IPOs with greater cash holdings invest significantly more in R&D.
Managerial Optimism and Short-Run Market Returns
In this section, I look at the relationship between File-to-Value, the price adjustment between the file date and the offer date, and the return on the first day of trading. Most theories assume market efficiency and treat the first-day closing price as the correct value of the IPO, which implies that IPOs are on average deeply underpriced at the offer. For example, Rock (1986) proposes a winner's curse interpretation whereby underpricing is necessary to induce uninformed investors to participate in the offering. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) link underpricing to truth-telling of investors in the book-building process. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) relate underpricing to underwriter reputation or a changing issuer objective function. Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that underpricing may be a result of managers who anchor at the midpoint of the file price range and do not bargain hard to reduce underpricing because they are satisfied from their personal gains relative to this reference point.
If managers are more optimistic about assets in place, they tend to overvalue their firm's future cash flows, or alternately undervalue the discount rate, either of which may lead to a higher firm valuation relative to that of the market (Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005) ). It is therefore possible that managers who are more optimistic about assets in place have a lower price adjustment, a lower first-day return or both. However, if managerial optimism is positively correlated with institutional and retail investor demand, an optimistic manager's high valuation may not lead to a lower price adjustment or first-day return. Indeed, it might lead to a higher price adjustment or first-day return. A third possibility is that optimistic managers also tend to anchor at the middle point of the file price range. 22 This would lead to a positive relationship between managerial optimism and first-day return. While I cannot predict ex ante the direction of these relationships, I still examine them to gain insight into the impact of managerial optimism on the price adjustment and first-day return. The cross-sectional relationship with the first-day return (FDRET) in columns 3 and 4 is formally tested using the same multivariate regression model as above, except that FDRET is the independent variable and PADJ is included as an additional explanatory variable in order to see the impact of File-to-Value above and beyond its impact on the price adjustment. File-to-Value is significantly and positively related to FDRET (at the 1% level of significance), controlling for the effect of the price adjustment. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in FTV (RFTV) is associated with a 7.6% (6.9%) increase in the first-day return.
23 See Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist (2007) for reviews of IPO pricing.
The cross-sectional relationship with the total return (TOTRET) in columns 5 and 6 is formally tested using the same multivariate regression model as above, except that TOTRET is the independent variable. File-to-Value is significantly and positively related to TOTRET (at the 1% level of significance). Economically, a one standard deviation increase in FTV (RFTV) is associated with an 18.7% (16.0%) increase in the total return. This evidence is most consistent with the notion that optimistic managers use the middle point of the file price range as a reference point, since underwriters have yet to produce any information at the file date. Further, information asymmetry, underwriter and VC certification, uncertainty and market sentiment have all been controlled for.
Notable in Table 9 is the impact of the predicted File-to-Value (PFTV). In the Model 2 regressions on PADJ and TOTRET, PFTV has a significantly positive impact on PADJ and TOTRET (at the 1% level of significance). In particular, a one standard deviation increase in PFTV is associated with a 6.0% and 13.4% increase in the price adjustment and total return, respectively. However, PFTV does not have any significant impact on first-day returns. Also, the VC valuation has a significantly positive impact on the short-run returns in each of the regressions. This may represent the impact of value added by Venture Capitalists before the VC valuation date, which is not picked up by predicted File-to-Value. Consistent with this idea, book value divided by the VC valuation (BV/VCV), which may also capture this earlier VC effect, has a significantly negative effect on short-run returns. The effects of other variables are consistent with those found in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . One exception is firm age (AGE), which is insignificant in the FDRET regressions. This is due to the inclusion of PADJ as an additional independent variable. Removing PADJ, AGE has a significantly negative impact on FDRET.
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Conclusions
This paper attempts to determine whether the long-run underperformance that has been found empirically in some IPOs, can be explained in part by the level of optimism of firm managers. I find that IPOs with more optimistic managers underperform IPOs with less optimistic managers in the long-run. Moreover, the IPOs of the most optimistic managers underperform in the long-run when compared to a benchmark portfolio, while the IPOs of the least optimistic manager do not. These results hold in calendar-time regressions and are robust to style-adjusting and value-weighting. Furthermore, firms with more optimistic managers invest less in R&D and capital expenditures relative to firms with less optimistic managers, and the investment is sensitive to cash flows. These results suggest that the underperformance of these firms is driven by the underinvestment of the most optimistic managers. One potential explanation for the results found in this paper is that there is asymmetric information between managers and investors. Stein (2003) notes that managerial optimism shares its predictions with models of agency theory or models of information asymmetry. I include multiple independent variables to control for the empire-building manager's preference for presiding over a larger firm and the information asymmetry between the manager and investors. A second explanation is that optimistic managers unwittingly price their issue at a high value because they overestimate their future cash flows or underestimate the discount rate, whereas market timing managers realize that their assets are overvalued in the market, and price their offer high to take advantage of this misvaluation. I control for this alternate explanation by including variables of consumer and investor optimism, as well as uncertainty, all of which may be at the root of the misvaluation which managers would potentially take advantage of. A third explanation is that long-run market performance is driven by current accruals (Teoh et al. (1998a) ). Managers can increase current 28 29 accruals by, for example, advancing recognition of revenues with credit sales before cash is received or by delaying the recognition of expenses when cash is advanced to suppliers. While the source of earnings management could be optimistic managers, I still control for this effect by including a measure of discretionary current accruals as an explanatory variable.
This paper contributes to the IPO literature by documenting empirically for the first time a role for managerial optimism in explaining the long-run performance of some IPOs. This relationship is driven by managers who are optimistic about assets in place and underinvest in their firm in the years after the offer. This is also the first time that underinvestment has been found in a sample of IPOs, which may not be surprising given these firms are precisely the types of firms which are not likely to have sufficient internal funds to subsidize all of their prospective projects. I also find evidence that more optimistic managers are more prone to anchoring, supporting the idea that managers use the middle of the file price range as a reference point. The results suggest some avenues for future work. In particular, can the findings in this paper be extended to other types of financing arrangements? Also, can the theoretical link between overinvestment/underinvestment and long-run underperformance be made more explicit? These questions are left to future research.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
ΔConsumer Sentiment is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the consumer sentiment index at the file date to the consumer sentiment index at the VC valuation date.
ΔCPI is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the consumer price index at the file date to the consumer price index at the VC valuation date.
ΔInvestor Sentiment is the percentage difference between investor sentiment at the file date and investor sentiment at the VC valuation date.
ΔS&P 500 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the S&P 500 index at the file date to the S&P 500 index at the VC valuation date.
Additional Funding is the total amount of venture capital financing received by the IPO firm between the venture capital valuation date and the filing date, in millions of 2004 dollars.
AGE is the number of years between the IPO date and the company's founding date.
Assets are from the 12 months prior to the IPO (if available in SDC) or from the fiscal year prior to the IPO, and are measured in millions of 2004 dollars.
BHR, the raw buy-and-hold return, is the IPO firm's buy-and-hold return using monthly returns, starting the month after the offer and ending 5 years later.
BV is the book value of equity in the year of the IPO.
CEO Age is the chief executive officer's (CEO's) age at the time of the IPO.
CF, cash flow, is the ratio of net cash flow to prior year assets.
CH, cash holdings, is the ratio of cash & marketable securities to prior year assets.
Consumer Sentiment is the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers' consumer sentiment index in the filing month.
DCA is the discretionary current accruals in the year of the IPO, as calculated in Teoh et al. (1998a) .
Early Stage equals 1 if the firm received its last VC valuation during an early stage level, and 0 otherwise.
EDUCATION equals 0 if the CEO has no degree, 1 if the CEO has a bachelor's degree, 2 if the CEO has a master's degree, and 3 if the CEO has a doctorate.
Expansion Stage equals 1 if the firm received its last VC valuation during an expansion stage level, and 0 otherwise.
FDRET is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the first trading day closing market price to the offer price.
File Range is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the high point to the low point of the file price range.
Fraction Sold is the ratio of primary shares sold in the offer to the number of shares outstanding before the offer plus the number of primary shares sold in the offer.
FTV is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the file valuation (FV) to the VC valuation (VCV).
FV, the file valuation, is the ratio of the middle point of the filing range multiplied by the number of shares outstanding before the offer plus the number of shares filed.
GENDER equals 1 if the CEO is male, and 0 otherwise.
I, investment, is the ratio of research & development plus capital expenditures to prior year assets.
Investor Sentiment is the Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment index in the filing month.
Late Stage equals 1 if the firm received its last VC valuation during a late stage level, and 0 otherwise.
Leverage, long-term debt to assets, is the ratio of long-term debt to prior year assets.
NASDAQ equals to 1 when the IPO is listed on the Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise.
Nbr of Days is the number of calendar days between the VC valuation date and the file date.
Nbr of Rounds is the total number of rounds of financing an IPO has received.
Nbr of VC firms is the total number of VC firms that have provided funding to the IPO firm.
NYSE equals to 1 when the IPO is listed on the NYSE, and 0 otherwise.
PADJ is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the offer price to the middle point in the filing range.
PFTV is the predicted value from the regession of FTV on market, venture capital and underwriter characteristics (i.e. the predicted value from Model 3 in Table 2 ).
RFTV is the residual from the regession of FTV on market, venture capital and underwriter characteristics (i.e. the residual from Model 3 in Table 2 ).
Sales are from the 12 months prior to the IPO (if available in SDC) or from the fiscal year prior to the IPO, and are measured in millions of 2004 dollars.
SBHR, the style-adjusted buy-and-hold return, is the difference between the IPO firm's BHR and the BHR from an equal-weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-market, starting the month after the offer and ending 5 years later.
Seed Stage equals 1 if the firm received its last VC valuation during a seed stage level, and 0 otherwise.
TECH equals 1 if the firm is in a high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise.
Total Funding is the total financing an IPO firm has received from all of its VCs.
TOTRET is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the first trading day closing market price to the middle point in the filing range.
UWREP is the average Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rating of all lead underwriters in the IPO.
VCREP is the lead venture capitalist's (VC) IPO market share in the 3 years prior to the IPO year. The IPO market share is the ratio of the gross proceeds excluding overallotments of the IPOs backed by the lead VC to those of all VCs.
VCV, the VC valuation, is the venture capital firm's valuation obtained within three years before the file date. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Number 
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